The American Way of War: Guided Missiles, Misguided Men, and a Republic in Peril
(Libby/OverDrive eAudiobook)

A scholar and documentary film maker (Why We Fight), Jarecki presents a succinct explanation of why modern presidents can make war whenever they feel like it. Jarecki writes that America's founders worried about presidential belligerence, so the Constitution gave war-making authority to Congress, which declared all our foreign wars through WWII--and none afterward. Drawing on historical research and interviews, he emphasizes that the young America was less isolationist than histories proclaim, invading Canada and Mexico several times and taking great interest in international affairs. But war fever really arose only with the start of the Cold War. Suddenly presidents commanded an enormous peacetime force and wielded the immense powers Roosevelt had acquired in WWII. Since then, Congress has gone along with presidential decisions to make war (then grumble if it doesn't go well). Today President Bush asserts that terrorism requires a perpetual state of emergency and that he will launch a pre-emptive war if he detects a threat to America's security. In this illuminating--and to some, perhaps, discouraging--book, Jarecki says there is only a modest groundswell of opinion to curb presidential powers. (Oct. 14) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

Jarecki (founder, the Eisenhower Project), director of the documentary films Why We Fight and The Trials of Henry Kissinger, here traces the evolution of the military-industrial complex and its often troubling consequences, which include the concentration of power and secrecy in the Executive Branch. Using selective quotes and evidence, Jarecki argues that apparently reasonable defense policies have in fact led to such deleterious results as the creation of the Defense Department and the CIA after World War II. Much of the book rings true, but it's a hard read and the author imputes "imperial presidency" motives to every military policy decision in sight. A large part of the book attacks Bush and a prostrate Congress for mismanagement, proliferation of secrecy, lack of accountability, unconstitutional arrogation of power to the President, and perversion of such arcane military strategy theories as John Boyd's OODA loop (for Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) concept. Not for the lay reader; dedicated military and political enthusiasts will be interested, but only libraries with extensive subject collections need consider.--Edwin B. Burgess, U.S. Army Combined Arms Research Lib., Fort Leavenworth, KS (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

A pithy historical exploration of why it's so easy for American presidents to make war. Today's neoconservatives who assert that America is a force for good in the world and should use its armies to spread this goodness insist they follow a hallowed American tradition. They are only partly wrong, concedes international-affairs scholar and documentary filmmaker Jarecki. Isolation was never a U.S. policy. From the beginning, America took an interest in European affairs and went to war whenever it seemed advantageous. Yet despite attacks on Canada in 1814, Mexico in 1845 and 1914 and Spain in 1898, pugnacious presidents were inhibited by a minuscule standing army and a citizenry that never felt threatened. This changed after 1945, when most Americans accepted that the Soviet Union was a deadly menace. For the first time, Congress approved a massive peacetime military force and allowed the president to retain vastly expanded executive powers. Today the Defense Department spends 93 percent of America's money devoted to foreign affairs; the State Department gets the other seven. Jarecki makes a convincing case that immense peacetime military procurement has corrupted Congress. All legislators, however liberal, fight fiercely to bring contracts into their districts and oppose cuts. The collapse of communism threatened this system, but 9/11 reopened the floodgates to another avalanche of defense appropriations, almost all irrelevant to fighting terrorists. When President Bush discusses military action against another country (e.g., Iran), editorials debate the pros and cons but take for granted that the decision is his alone. Jarecki points out that the president enjoyed almost universal support when he invaded Iraq and Afghanistan. He lost it when they turned into quagmires, but few voices advocate restricting his powers. Disturbing and depressing. Copyright ©Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.